Back to 6 October 2023
Although severely weakened, Hezbollah will not implement the ceasefire agreement, but will instead prepare for the next war. This raises the risk of bouts of war in 2025.
At 4 am local time, when the 60 day ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah came into into effect, residents of south Lebanon, most of whom are Hezbollah supporters, began returning to their villages, including to the border with Israel.
This almost certainly provided cover for the rotation and resupply of fighters, with the aim of preparing for a new round with Israel, whenever it comes.
Logic of Hezbollah supporters’ return
During the war, Hezbollah’s late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared that the condition for victory was the return of Israeli residents to the north: if the Israelis returned without an agreement, they would have won. If they did not, they would have lost. Returning south Lebanon residents before north Israel residents allows the group to spin a narrative of victory, even though its missile stockpile was evidently severely depleted, even though its leadership was mostly killed, and even though it was unable to inflict a fraction of the damage that it was expected to inflict on Israel with its missiles.
Even though Israel can claim obvious and startling military successes in this war, by returning its residents first, Hezbollah spins a narrative of victory on the rubble of its supporters’ homes. It also ensures that it can rebuild its capabilities along the Israeli border within two-three years and that its existing positions are reinforced. This is a perfect replica of the outcome of the 2006 war, even though Israel was far more tactically successful this time.
A strategic and tactical assessment
Here's what has changed after the Israel - Hezbollah war:
Hezbollah lost its use as an Iranian deterrent for at least two years if not more. Hezbollah’s capabilities have been gradually getting built up over 18 years, and it lost much of them. This is the most important point. Israel and the US can now strike Iran without fearing Hezbollah's retaliation.
Much of Hezbollah's ability to defend the first line of villages was destroyed, and many of its defences in depth were weakened, again, at least temporarily.
Hezbollah's ability to launch a 7 October cross border attacks into Israel was severely reduced, at least for a year or two. The elite Ridwan Force, tasked with this operation, had its entire command wiped out.
Hezbollah's leadership needs to be fully reconstituted, and it needs a long period to understand how Israeli intelligence penetrated so deeply. The top three leadership echelons and much of the lower frontline command was killed largely due to intelligence failures.
Hezbollah lost the ability to deter Israel from conducing sporadic attacks within Lebanon. Israel can show that it is serious about stopping Hezbollah rebuilding by conducting airstrikes, accepting the risk that Hezbollah would retaliate with rocket fire.
There is a US-led monitoring mechanism to stop Hezbollah re-arming, supported by British-built surveillance infrastructure along the Syria-Lebanon border. This is a monitoring, not enforcement, mechanism at this stage.
This mechanism does give Israel the right to strike Hezbollah again, and guarantee Israel full backing.
The Israeli ground forces were worn down to some extent, given that they've been fighting for over a year, with two months of very intense conflict in Lebanon. The Israeli army has never operated for so long continuously.
Israel may be ready to resume the war in a few weeks if it saw the need to, and the Israeli cabinet and public are willing. Moreover, Israel would have greater US backing if Hezbollah violates the agreement.
The tolerance for Hezbollah and its weapons among other Lebanese parties is at an all time low. The gap between it and the rest of the Lebanese has never been bigger.
Syria's influence over Hezbollah has increased. The Syrian Alawites and Hezbollah’s Shia are rivals as well as allies. Syria likely does not want to be merely an Iranian satrapy, but an independent player.
Russia's ability to assert itself against Iran in Syria and Lebanon has increased, but it will only use that if it gets what it wants in Europe.
Here's what did NOT change:
Hezbollah is still deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border and retains defence in depth capabilities in the second, third and fourth lines of villages south of the Litani River.
Hezbollah is still the strongest player in Lebanon, far stronger than the Lebanese Army.
The Lebanese Army is still not willing to fight Hezbollah, and, even if it suddenly were willing to do so, it would splinter.
UNIFIL is still unable to accomplish its mandate without risking a Hezbollah insurgency, which would trigger a bigger regional and international conflict.
The Lebanese political class is still afraid of Hezbollah and is unwilling to confront it or force it to disarm.
Hezbollah still has no credible or capable domestic challenger. If it wants to rearm, it will have to be the Israelis who stop it, not UNIFIL or any Lebanese actors.
What COULD change is:
If Israel resumes the war, and occupies parts of Lebanon up to Jezzine and Rachaya, it could connect with Christians and Druse enough to create a force to counter Hezbollah. This would doom Lebanon into a civil war, and the Syrians would back the anti-Hezbollah side. Mainstream Christian and Druse leaders are NOT willing to go this far, especially while Iran and Syria are such dominant players.
If America reaches a deal with Russia over Ukraine, the Russians could force the Syrians to expel the Iranians, so long as the Syrians get reliable assurances. However, given how the Americans treated Gaddafi, the odds of the Syrians accepting a deal are low. The Iranians would have to be severely weakened and the Russians would have to apply massive pressure for that to changed. The latter is unlikely without something cataclysmic, such as the US leaving NATO.
The US under Trump may decide on an conciliate, confront, contain foreign policy: It may choose to conciliate Russia by giving serious concessions in the Balkans and Ukraine. It may choose to contain China through tariffs, negotiations and threats. And to confront Iran, up to launching a war against Iran. Sufficient damage to the Iranian industrial base and economy may be the only way of truly changing the strategic picture in the Middle East, even if it does not lead to regime change.
Implications:
Although, in military terms, Hezbollah was without doubt defeated, and failed to fulfil its threats against Israel, or to inflict as much damage as Israeli training exercises expected, Hezbollah is creating a narrative of political victory, based on the fact that the group survived and will return to its previous practices.
Objectively, Hezbollah succeeded in its declared political objective of preventing the return of Israeli residents to the north without a political agreement with it. It succeeded in inflicting a cost on Israel for its ground incursions in Lebanon. It failed in its declared objective of pressuring Israel into accepting a Gaza ceasefire.
Moreover, Israel failed in its declared objective of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani, given that the group will not implement the ceasefire agreement. It failed to return residents to the north, with municipal leaders calling on residents to remain where they are. It succeeded in its objective of separating Hezbollah and Hamas.
Without any doubt, whenever there is a ceasefire in Gaza, Hezbollah will take partial credit for it and confirm that its strategy was wise and successful. Israel’s only means of preventing the Resistance Axis from constructing a victory narrative and preparing for another round is to resettle parts of Gaza.
This mindset, Hezbollah and Hamas believe, reflects the religious virtues of steadfastness, sacrifice and patience. They view this war in religious terms, with rewards in the end times, not on earth. We examine this here. They will not back down due to political agreements or military setbacks.
Hezbollah will not disarm, even if it has to fight a civil war in Lebanon to do so.
The only way to remove Hezbollah is for Israel to go deep inside Lebanon, which may take up to a year of fighting and be immensely costly, or to take Iran out of the picture.
It is not clear that the US has the political will to fight Iran. Rather, Mujtaba Khamenei succeeding his father Ali Khamenei as supreme leader may reinvigorate Iran’s commitment to the fight against the US for control over the Middle East.
As such, without any major shift in the region and if the ceasefire becomes permanent, by 2026 or 2027 we will be back to 6 October 2023:
Iran will be the dominant player in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
The US will be a poor security guarantor for the Gulf states and its other allies.
American policymakers will be wondering whether to double down in the Middle East by bombing Iran, or to abandon the Middle East and focus on their domestic problems.
Given the above, there is a severe risk of the war resuming, with sporadic conflicts lasting from several days to several weeks breaking out in 2025. But even that may not change the strategic picture.