Hezbollah defeated
Hezbollah surrenders on paper, but implementation is questionable and Hezbollah's likely attempts to avoid it risk reigniting the war.
Commercial Summary: The ceasefire agreement, if implemented, represents a major strategic victory for Israel and paves the way for another victory in Gaza. If Hezbollah refuses to implement the agreement, this would guarantee the resumption of the conflict, this time with even bigger Western backing against Hezbollah. The ongoing collapse of the Lebanese state is likely to continue, especially if, as is likely, Hezbollah refuses to disarm fully. Attempts to prevent Hezbollah from rearming without an agreement with Iran would raise terrorism risks in Lebanon against Western interests, especially the US and Germany, Britain and France. The defanging of Iran make strikes on Iran more likely, with the new Iranian administration likely to prefer a deal to a conflict with the Trump administration. However, the IRGC remains a major obstacle to a viable, enforceable agreement, requiring some escalation. In all likelihood, the ceasefire will be severely tested and risks breaking down.
Israel has agreed to a 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah. If implemented, this would be a major strategic victory for Israel. The ceasefire begins at 4 am on 27 November.
Below, we discuss these terms of the ceasefire and their implications.
Ceasefire terms
Mutual withdrawals: Israel will withdraw from south Lebanon over 60 days, during which Hezbollah withdraws north of the Litani River in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Notably, the agreement does not specifically call for Hezbollah to disarm, but refers to 1701, which refers to 1559, which does require it to disarm.
Strengthening the Lebanese Army: Backed by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, the Army would dismantle Hezbollah’s positions in South Lebanon as Israel withdraws. It would also prevent the manufacturing and transferring of weapons by Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Border demarcation over disputed points: Israel and Lebanon would negotiate a final demarcation of the border between them.
International oversight: A US-German-French committee would oversee the implementation of and compliance with the agreement. It is unclear how this would be implemented. The British have deployed border surveillance posts along the border. These are known to Hezbollah and other smugglers and actively (and easily) avoided. In any case, Israel and Lebanon can apply to this committee and receive authorisation to use force in case of infractions of the agreement.
Right to interdict: Israel would retain the right to interdict Hezbollah weapons shipments in Syria and elsewhere.
Prisoners: Israel would hold on to Hezbollah prisoners and gives no guarantees that it would not target Hezbollah leaders (presumably Hezbollah would be able to retaliate to the best of its abilities).
Israel would retain the right to attack imminent threats, guaranteed by the US in a separate agreement.
Limitations of the agreement
Hezbollah had previously agreed to the implementation of UNSCR1701, which stipulates that it would withdraw north of the Litani River. However, it never implemented the agreement, claiming that Israel’s violations justified its own.
This time might be different, in that:
Hezbollah has been severely weakened. To be able to fire 250-350 missiles in one day on 24 November, it had to cut its missile fire for more than a week before that. Hezbollah’s rate of fire fell well below the level that Israel had been training for in its exercises (and that we had expected). This suggests an inability to resupply and a severely depleted stockpile, confirming Israeli claims about having destroyed major weapons depots.
Israel has shown that it is willing to fight for an extended period, and that it can invade south Lebanon with an acceptable casualty rate. This was not true in 2006.
The US has stepped in as a guarantor of the agreement with oversight of its implementation.
Hezbollah’s narrative of deterrence has collapsed. The tolerance for its weapons among its Lebanese allies is extremely low.
Hezbollah remains unable to address its intelligence failures against Israel.
Strategic implications
Lebanon
As written, and if implemented, the agreement paves the way for the disarmament by denying it its raison d’etre. Even without disarmament, the agreement implies Hezbollah’s surrender. However, in Lebanon, there are almost never any decisive solutions. Everything ends up being a strange compromise, reliant on a permanently shifting balance of power.
The group may view the agreement in a manner similar to how Hamas agreed to end the 2021 and 2022 conflicts with Israel: as a means to rearm and prepare for a much bigger escalation, this time fully coordinated with Iran. This would almost certainly be detected by the monitoring committee and by Israel, however, even if such preparations remain north of the Litani River. This would trigger another conflict.
If Hezbollah does withdraw from the Israel-Lebanon border area, the group’s raison d’etre as a defender of Lebanon against Israel is removed, even more so if the border disputes between Israel and Lebanon are settled as the agreement stipulates. The other Lebanese sects will demand that Hezbollah be disarmed or integrated into the military, or they will seek to arm themselves against it to create balance. This would obviously raise the risk of further state fragmentation. The Christians of Lebanon are demanding some form of separation from the Muslims, and a collapsed state that is forced to accept de-centralisation may be the best option. This suggests a prolonged period of chaos until a new political pact is agreed and the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is resolved in full.
The West’s plan is to strengthen the Lebanese Army, have the current commander of the Army become president, and use this influence to keep Hezbollah in check. However, as things stand, the Lebanese army remains weaker than Hezbollah and less well-trained, with many of its rank and file sympathetic to the group. The presence of a US-led monitoring group suggests Western intent to be heavily involved in Lebanon to manage Hezbollah. Without addressing Lebanon’s chronic corruption problem, which results from its diversity, very little can be achieved.
Britain has been building border surveillance towers between Syria and Lebanon. These would presumably be used to stop weapons smuggling in cooperation with the Lebanese Army, UNIFIL and even perhaps sects hostile to Hezbollah. If restrictions against Hezbollah rearming are enforced, and this is not part of an agreement with Iran, Hezbollah will lash out by attacking domestic opponents and Western interests. This too will guarantee Israeli escalation, including by backing Lebanese proxies.
Alternatively, Hezbollah may choose not to implement the agreement in full, or Israel may take the two months’ period to rest, recover, rearm, restock and relaunch the war.
The region
If the ceasefire holds, this paves the way for Israel to fully defeat Hamas and resettle the north of the Gaza Strip. Israel is also near-certain to escalate in the West Bank to defeat Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions there. As such, Iran’s main deterrents against Israel - its ability to instigate violence all along its borders - will soon be severely degraded.
If the ceasefire agreement is implemented, rather than merely holding, at least in terms of Hezbollah withdrawing north of the Litani River, it may lead to either of two scenarios:
The US and Iran reach a new nuclear agreement, whereby Iranian military influence is restricted to Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf. Iran abandons its fight against Israel in all but rhetoric and abandons Hezbollah. This would be the most stable outcome for Lebanon. We believe that the Iranians would want a deal, given the new administration, but that the IRGC would not permit the surrender of Hezbollah. An agreement of this sort requires internal change within Iran. Instigating such changes may require limited strikes against Iran to display US power.
The US intensively strikes Iran, taking advantage of the fact that Iran’s deterrence capabilities - including its ability to attack Israel - have been severely eroded. Iranian air defence is quickly defeated, and American cruise missiles do most of the damage in the initial phase before more intense bombing starts. Iran responds with attacks on US bases in the Middle East and especially the Gulf, but the US accepts that risk as explained below. The Iranian regime is severely destabilised, but does not collapse.
