Impact on Saudi Arabia
Why the Hamas offensive is not connected to Saudi normalisation talks with Israel, and how the war will impact the Saudi economy.
Hamas wants to end the existence of the State of Israel. It views Israel as an apartheid genocidal state dressed as a liberal democracy. It does not accept the concept of a Jewish homeland. It believes that Muslims are entitled to rule the Holy Land, as they, in Hamas’ view, hold the final, uncorrupted Revelation from God and are a majority in the wider region. This is the first and most important driver of Hamas’ actions, all of them.
If Saudi Arabia did normalise ties, the public in the Muslim world would still oppose Israel - Egypt's normalisation changed nothing in that regard, and was never accepted by the public. Ditto for Jordan. And Hamas knows this. This is not to say that Hamas would never conduct an attack to embarass the Saudis if they did normalise. However, an attack of this magnitude is based on more than the need to embarass someone, as it is a decision to risk entering a regional war that could drag in the US. Saudi normalisation, in and of itself, would not suffice for taking such a risk.
That the timing was close to when the talks were allegedly progressing is also unrelated.
First, there is no evidence that the Saudis were ready to pull the trigger on normalisation - their stated precondition, a resolution to the Palestinian issue, was deliberately unattainable. The Saudis would have had to drop that precondition to actually normalise, which they never did. It is conceivable that the Saudis would have done so for the right price. However, the normalisation talks themselves seemed to be a means for the Saudis to buy time and keep the Americans and Israelis engaged while Saudi Arabia repositioned itself in the region.
Second, this operation took two years of planning, according to Hamas officials, meaning that planning started when Joe Biden was still treating Saudi Arabia as a pariah, well before the normalisation talks took off.
Third, the timing of a military operation of this magnitude is tied to preparedness and to the fear of detection - losing the element of surprise would have scuttled the whole plan. Hamas could not build up this capability and then let it rest indefinitely, as it has so far failed to deter Israel, unlike, say, Hizbullah. If the operation were detected, Israel would have conducted a pre-emptive strike. So, once preparations were ready, the operation had to be launched sooner rather than later, regardless of other issues.
Last, the timing was set to coincide with increased militant activity in the West Bank (instigated and supported by the Resistance Axis, and which distracted the Israeli military), the end of summer (this will be a long war, and the rainy weather will give less opportunities for the Israeli Air Force eventually), Jewish holidays and a Shabbat.
There is simply no evidence that Saudi Arabia factored into this. That the operation may have killed the normalisation track is just one additional benefit as far as Hamas is concerned, but it is an ancilliary benefit, not an objective of the campaign. That said, the Hamas operation is likely to have a dramatic impact on Saudi Arabia’s economic plans, however, as I discuss below, behind the pay wall.