Israel's strategic bind
Implications for Hormuz, and for Lebanon's non-payment risks.
The Israelis have failed in their second attempt in as many years to completely defeat Hezbollah, despite the group’s massive losses, which include stockpiles, tunnel networks, operatives, frontline villages, midlevel leaders, and much of the top leadership.
The Israelis did succeed in expanding a buffer zone along the border with Lebanon. However, without a political agreement, this guarantees that Israel will be stuck in a new buffer zone fighting a war of attrition against the Lebanese Shi’a, backed by Iran, Iraqi militias, and the government of San’a in Yemen. Israel was in exactly the same quagmire between 1984 and 2000, and had to withdraw due to politically unsustainable losses, at a time when Hezbollah was backed only by Iran and Syria.
Turkey’s logic
Moreover, the Turks are unenthusiastic, to put it mildly, to help Israel defeat Hezbollah using their Syrian proxies. Rather, Turkey is more interested in preserving Hezbollah for as long as Israel remains expansionist - their fear is that, without Hezbollah as a buffer, Israel would link up with the Christian and Alawite communities along the Eastern Mediterranean, extending its influence to Syria’s Latakia, Hama, and even Aleppo.
Furthermore, any Syrian operation against Lebanon, as suggested by American President Donald Trump, would very likely trigger Iraqi intervention in Syria, backed by Iran, risking a Turkish-Iranian conflict. While this conflict is likely at some point in our generation, this appears unlikely in the next five years.
American support
Additionally, and most critically, the Israelis are facing the prospect of a confrontation with Iran on their own, without American backing. Iran is linking re-opening Hormuz to Israel agreeing to a ceasefire in Lebanon. Although the ceasefire is holding, it is only a matter of time before Hezbollah relaunches attacks on Israeli occupation forces on Lebanese territory. The Israelis will then want to pressure the civilian population by bombarding densely populated urban areas. At that point, it is very likely that Iran will either retaliate directly, instruct its proxies in Iraq and Yemen to retaliate, or provide Hezbollah with additional capabilities to permit it to strike Israeli cities, as it had been able to do in the early stages of the 2023-2025 7 October War and during the 2006 July War.
Iran - US negotiations
This is the context in which the Iran-US talks are taking place.
The Iranians are trying to force the USA to rein in Israel and compel it to withdraw from Lebanese territories, using their strengthened negotiating position and their control over Hormuz.
As for the Israelis, they insist on defeating Hezbollah, sooner rather than later. If the fight were delayed, the Israelis would have to return to war and mobilisation, which would be hugely unpopular. Electorally, pausing the war would damage Netanyahu enormously, while withdrawing from Lebanon would be a humiliating defeat. Moreover, after 7 October, the Israelis fear that Hezbollah would launch its own similar operation with support from Iran and its regional proxies. The Israelis cannot afford to accept a ceasefire in Lebanon, let alone a withdrawal.
At the same time, the Israelis recognise that they cannot fight a prolonged insurgency in which Hezbollah establishes rules of the game that permit Iran to strike Israel were Israel to strike Lebanese urban areas. The best they can achieve is to sit tight and wait for the next war, while trying to influence the American political system to break the deal with Iran.
