What China might be learning from Ukraine and the Middle East Wars
Naval blockade, attacks on ports, gradual escalation, the need for a high casualty tolerance, and pressure to act sooner rather than later.
Ukraine lessons:
Cut resupply early: China must assume that the West would accelerate the transfer of weapons to Taiwan upon the opening of hostilities. China must therefore besiege and/or damage all ports that it cannot control, which will likely include all ports except Taipei and perhaps Kee Lung. For those, it would seek to impose an inspection mechanism to allow in food and fuel.
Flood the skies with drones and missiles: China would need to prioritise neutralising air defence systems. This would require repeated strikes that combine missiles and drones, partly intended to force air defence systems to reveal their locations through interceptions. This would then facilitate larger, more potent strikes.
High consumption items: Assets such as destroyers, main battle tanks, helicopters and airplanes need to be considered high consumption items. In a conflict with Taiwan, China must expect to lose a significant number of destroyers to anti-ship missiles, with that helping protect transports and identify anti-ship battery positions. Destroying those positions would facilitate an eventual ground invasion.
Communications and leadership: Zelensky turned into a wartime leader to whom the public rallied in the first year of war (much less so now, perhaps). China may assume that preventing this phenomenon requires decapitating the Taiwanese military and civilian leadership early on during the war, and shutting down media.
Retaliation in depth: Despite Russia’s military superiority, Ukraine has regularly successfully attacked targets in depth in Russia, using a combination of Western weapons, creatively used, and sabotage. It is very likely that the West will assist Taiwan in a similar manner, using espionage networks within China.
The time is now: The West is struggling to supply Ukraine with weapons, in part due to the political mess in the US, but also because so much has been given already, with little effect. That said, the talk from the West suggests that there may be an effort to militarise society and turn to a war economy. It is best for China then to strike sooner rather than later, and launch a blockade to force the issue, rather than an invasion – that can come later, after an extended conflict. This would be especially true if the US got entangled in the Middle East.
Sanctions and asset seizures: The West will likely respond to a Taiwan invasion with sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. However, while Chinese assets risk being seized, this will not deter China, nor is China unable to respond. Furthermore, just as Iran and Russia are successfully evading sanctions, China can do the same.
Red Sea lessons:
Precision targeting of ships: There have been repeated stories claiming that the Chinese are unable to target ships in motion. That the Houthi can do it makes this question a non-starter. Obviously, China can target ships in motion.
Use of satellites: It is very likely that the US has disabled the radars that the Houthis are using. Yet, somehow, this has not affected their targeting. That suggests that the Iranians, likely with access to Chinese satellites and support from the Chinese naval base in Djibouti, are helping the Houthi with their targeting operations.
Friend – foe identification: Chinese ships are still traversing the Red Sea freely, without risk of attack. This reflects the ability of China to coordinate with the Houthi to identify friendly ships and avoid targeting them. This lesson will be valuable in a putative blockade of Taiwanese ports.
Reciprocity and gradual escalation: China’s fear is that Taiwan would be used to blockade Chinese ports, an understandable fear given the geography. However, Taiwan cannot expect to successfully stop shipping to China, as that would result in China tightening the noose on Taiwan significantly, similar to how Israel is using aid as a negotiating tactic, and how Houthi attacks force Israel to increase aid flows to Gaza. Rather than initiate the conflict in an all-out manner, China will hold some force in reserve to keep Taiwan deterred from escalating in a manner that undermines the Chinese economy too much.
Other considerations:
Casualties: It is worth recalling that the Communist Party of China lost 1.5 million casualties (dead and wounded) in its revolution, and that China suffered between 3.8 million and 10 million total casualties during the Japanese occupation. The death toll in a Taiwan invasion, which will likely be cast as liberating the island from US occupation, may well be at that scale. It is worth recalling that Israel has killed 1.3% of Gaza’s population in the past five months of war. Russia, by contrast, has killed 0.02% of Ukraine’s civilian population in 21 months of war. These numbers should be kept in mind when considering potential casualties.
Risk Implications:
Taiwanese ports in the east and south of the island are very likely to be severely damaged.
China will likely conclude that it needs to cripple Taiwanese industry early on during the conflict, raising risks to the metals and chemicals industries in the island, but implying that industries such as paper, textiles and the like are at less risk.