Greater Israel: Why the war cannot end

Implications for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey.

Israeli strategy in the West Bank and Gaza, and the wider region, requires a broader explanation, which we attempt here, after which we will elaborate on the broader commercial consequences for Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Israel itself.

A different Israel

Briefly, Israel’s thinking and ambition has changed along with Israeli demographics: the secularists responsible for the creation of the State of Israel are now electorally far less numerous, but retain power in key institutions such as the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, some elite units in the IDF. The dominant electoral and political force is the fragmented Israeli right, which first won power in 1977 with Menachem Begin, and, along with Hamas, destroyed the Oslo Peace Accords in 1996-1999 and 2001-2006 with the (first) Netanyahu and Sharon premierships. From 2009 to 2020, Netanyahu dominated the political scene as the leader of the Israeli right. However, in those years, Netanyahu sought to manage the conflict with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Palestinians, while focussing on deepening Israeli control over the West Bank through new secure roads, more settlements, and various security measures. This management strategy was borne out of a realisation that Israel is severely outnumbered by Arabs, who, were they under a different leadership, may mobilise enough forces to overwhelm the IDF’s technological edge.

After the Hamas atrocities on 7 October, the Israeli right, still led by Netanyahu, has changed. It no longer seeks to manage conflicts but to win outright and decisively. Anything less would guarantee that in 5 years, or 20 years, another 7 October would happen, but this time, properly coordinated across multiple fronts. With that looming threat, there would be no reason to rebuild the communities along the border with Gaza or Lebanon, or to deepen settlements in the West Bank and secure Israel’s strategic depth (and control the holiest Jewish sites).

Israel’s aim now is to create demographic change in the areas that Israel aspires to control (West Bank, South Lebanon, South Syria, Gaza), in order to ensure that insurgent attacks similar to 7 October can never be repeated. This fear that is now animating Israel keeps it from recognising any strategic restraints, international law, or the need for compromise. Rather, Israel is now operating purely on the concept of might makes right, reinforced by Biblical claims to the land between the Euphrates and the Nile that are accepted by the most extreme elements of religious Zionism, who now play kingmaker in Israel’s Knesset (parliament).

Greater Israel

More land, more settlements

It was said of Russia that if it was not expanding, it was collapsing. The same is true of Israel today: the only way to beat Hamas and Hezbollah is to displace the populations that nurture them, as these are organic insurgencies that genuinely reflect their public’s will. To keep these populations away, Israel must settle the areas they inhabit with its own armed citizens. Settler expansionism is now Israel’s only strategic choice, regardless of the cost. It also happens to fit perfectly with the ideology of the Israeli religious right, which clearly aspires to a Greater Israel. Biblical Greater Israel extends from the Nile to the Euphrates, but, for the Israeli right, this is a multi-generational project, to be pursued gradually, with a few small chunks every few decades, rather than in a single war like 1967 and the subsequent 1978 peace treaty with Egypt. The ongoing war in Gaza creates a once in a lifetime opportunity to achieve at least parts of it. Prime Minister Netanyahu says he is on a spiritual mission in support of this project.

Netanyahu examining an amulet with a map of Greater Israel, given by his interviewer to Netanyahu’s wife, Sarah.

Syria

Part of this project is Israel’s expansion into Syrian territories after Assad’s fall, where it has captured the Mt Hermon region in full, placing it within 30km of the heart of Damascus, and a dozen kilometres away from the Beirut-Damascus Road, which it can now cut at will. The city of Damascus is in a militarily untenable position, with the high grounds of the Golan and Hermon in Israeli hands. This allows Israel to impose itself as the protector of the Druse, and to keep Syrian government forces away from its borders, as well as imposing terms on what kind of weapons the new Syrian government may have. Effectively, Israel has turned southern Syria into a buffer zone, but it still cannot control Dar’a, which has a population of around one million people. The importance of Dar’a is that it separates the Druse of the Golan and Mt Hermon from the Druse of Suweyda, meaning that Israeli logistics to support the Druse of Suweyda would be quite challenging if a Sunni insurgency were to eventually emerge.

Lebanon

Israel is also expanding into Lebanese territories, where it has prevented Shi’a refugees, naturally supportive of Hezbollah, from returning to villages within 3km of the border, and where it has taken control of several hills and strategic points, which it is fortifying with the intent of securing the Galilee, but also which serve as launching pads for further incursions into south Lebanon. There, Israel’s ambition is to gain control of the Litani and Wazzani rivers’ waters, and, perhaps, to link up with the Druse and Christian Mount Lebanon, where these communities fear both the Sunnis and the Shi’a.

Israel’s difficulties

Practicalities

The problem facing Israel is that displacing people is not easy, especially in modern times. It requires neighbouring countries to allow the displaced to flee. For Israel’s neighbours, especially Jordan and Egypt, this is a non-starter. Any perceived cooperation in the displacement and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians would firstly threaten their legitimacy, secondly create militant movements within their countries, and therefore, thirdly, lead to future wars with Israel. For Jordan and Egypt, the current borders are sacrosanct, and they reject displacing the Palestinians regardless of the casualties that Palestinian civilians suffer at the hands of the Israeli military.

Furthermore, there are still almost one million Palestinian civilians refusing to evacuate Gaza City. Israel is conducting an operation to fully occupy the city, but doing so with a million residents still there will likely cause an unprecedented number of civilian casualties, even greater than the spectacularly high civilian casualties Israel has already inflicted. If the civilians themselves refuse to leave, there is little that the military can do to compel them to do so.

The West’s position

An even bigger problem, however, is Israel’s reliance on the West. Contrary to propagandistic claims, Israel remains highly dependent on Western power for its mere survival. During Iran’s and Yemen’s various missile and drone strikes on Israel, the USA, France, Germany, and the UK, as well as American allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, all had to interfere and use their own air defence and air forces to prevent Israel’s from being overwhelmed. Moreover, without a steady supply of weapons, ammunition, intelligence, and technology, Israel would not be able to pursue its wars.

However, this support from the West is eroding, due in no small part to Israeli officials demanding that the West take Gazans, at a time when anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment is at a peak. It is also eroding due to the extent of Western involvement in defending Israel, and due to Israeli atrocities, including attacks on civilians, hospitals, journalists, and schools. One journalistic report found that up to 83% of casualties in Gaza were civilians, according to Israel’s own military intelligence figures.

Despite some exceptions, it can generally be said that the Western left is pro-Palestine, while the right is anti-Israel. Simply, within one or two electoral cycles, Western support for Israel could collapse. Especially as the West itself, particularly Europe, faces increased political instability that requires a hardnosed domestic focus.

Internal divisions

Crucially, divisions within Israel itself have also never been greater. The messianic view of a Greater Israel is not shared by the Tel Aviv secularists, who continue to protest, sometimes daily or weekly, against the cabinet of PM Netanyahu, and in favour of a final deal in Gaza that returns the hostages. This division is exacerbated by the fact that the most hardline parties in Israel are religious Zionists, and a large part of the religious Haredi community refuses to serve in the IDF.

Last, the Israeli Defence Forces themselves are not always fully committed to the Israeli right’s expansionist plans. Israel has had to lengthen the tours of reservists (while exempting the Haredi), and to shorten training periods for soldiers, in a bid to address the imbalance in the burden of military service. For the secularists, it appears that they are being asked to serve and die for the ambitions of religious fanatics who refuse to even serve. The IDF’s leadership is well aware of these divisions, and it is unclear that it wants the additional burdens that the political echelon is trying to impose.

Commercial Implications

• Every Israeli military success will be used to justify further military action against others among Israel’s neighbours. This type of aggressive expansionism - seen from the days of the Akkadians through Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, the Islamic Caliphate, the French Revolution, and the Mongols - is only stopped militarily, or when the expansionist party faces an internal crisis.

• The remaining 20 or so living hostages in Gaza are not a priority for the current cabinet. Rather, the cabinet wants to use them as an excuse to continue the war to achieve its ambitions of depopulating and annexing Gaza.